SEARCH AND SEIZURE-IMMIGRATION-INS FACTORY SURVEYS
Do NOT VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT-INS v. Delgado, 104
S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
It is currently estimated that there are between three and
one-half and six million undocumented aliens living in the
United States.' The presence of such large numbers of illegal
aliens 2 poses serious consequences for the country-economic as
well as social. 3 It has been claimed, for example, that illegal
aliens take jobs that would otherwise be filled by American workers, accept depressed wages, and reduce the effectiveness of labor unions.' Based on these contentions, the government has
asserted a substantial interest in reducing the influx of illegal
aliens. 5
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is
charged with the duty of apprehending illegal aliens and initiating deportation proceedings against them.6 Its activities take two
7
principal forms: border control and area control operations.
Border control primarily involves monitoring highway traffic at
or near the Mexican border.8 Area control operations are
designed to locate and apprehend illegal aliens in the interior of
the United States.9 One form of the area control operation is the
factory survey or sweep, which involves a "raid" on a factory or
workplace believed to employ large numbers of illegal aliens.10
Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1286, 1436 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Immigration Policy].

2 The term "illegal aliens" refers to (a) persons who enter the United States
lawfully on a temporary basis and subsequently remain in the country beyond the
time authorized by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (b) persons who
enter the United States without inspection at designated entry points, and

(c) persons who enter through the use of fraudulent papers. Fragomen, Searching
for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service Encounters the Fourth Amendment, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 82, 84 (1975).
3 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900-04 app. (1974) (Burger, C.J.,

concurring).
4 Id. at 903. But see Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1441-43 (suggesting ille-

gal immigration actually helps economy).
5 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-79 (1974).

6 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7 Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1375.
8 Id.; see, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). During
1984, the United States Border Patrol apprehended more than one million persons
attempting to illegally enter the country. Paterson News, Sept. 17, 1984, at 5, col.

1.
9 ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.

Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
10 Id. at 626.
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In INS v. Delgado," the Supreme Court addressed the fourth
amendment 1 2 implications of factory surveys. Typical of the
surveys under scrutiny were those undertaken at the Southern
California Davis Pleating Company (Davis)."3 Acting upon information that Davis was employing illegal aliens, INS investigators
placed the factory under visual surveillance in order to observe
the workers entering and leaving the workplace. 4 A number of
undocumented aliens were apprehended while attempting to
enter the Davis plant, and they gave statements indicating that
other illegal aliens were employed by Davis.' 5 In addition, a citizen employee of Davis complained to the INS that several illegal
aliens who previously had been deported had returned to work.' 6
On the basis of that information, as well as their own observations that Davis employed persons of "apparent Latin descent," 7
INS agents obtained, in January and September of 1977, warrants to search the Davis plant.' 8 Although both warrants were
issued on a showing of probable cause that illegal aliens were
employed at Davis, neither warrant named particular individuals.' 9 An additional survey was conducted in October 1977, at
another garment factory with the consent of the owner.20
All of the surveys were conducted in a similar manner. At
the outset, the employees were about their usual business: operating machinery and carrying out other job assignments. 2 1 Upon
entering the factory, several agents stationed themselves near the
building's exits to prevent anyone from escaping,- while others
dispersed themselves throughout the factory. 23 The surprise entry of the INS agents was greeted by shouts of "la migra"24 and
I1 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
12 The fourth amendment reads in part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . .against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'3 ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626-27 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
14 Id. at 626.
15 Id. at 627 n.5.
16 Id.

17 Id.
18 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1760.
19 Id.

Id.
Id. at 1763.
ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626-27 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
23 Delgado, 140 S. Ct. at 1760.
24 "La migra" refers to the immigration officials. ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d
624, 627 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
20
21
22
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many employees ran about the factory or attempted to hide.25
Although employees were free to continue their work and to walk
around,2 6 there was considerable disruption of the workplace.2 7
The agents displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies, and
were armed, although no weapons were drawn. 28 Proceeding
methodically through the rows of workers, the agents showed
their badges and asked pointed questions of the employees concerning their right to be in the country. 29 Typical of the incidents
which occurred during the surveys was respondent Herman Delgado's encounter with the INS agents." Mr. Delgado, a naturalized American citizen, was approached by two men who
identified themselves as immigration officers, displayed their
badges, and asked him to state where he was born.3" Delgado,
aware of what was taking place around him, answered that he was
a citizen. 2 As the agents were walking away, one remarked that
he wanted to check Delgado again "because he spoke English too
well." ' 33 During the course of the surveys, anyone suspected of
being an illegal alien was handcuffed and led away. 34 A total of
over 150 suspected illegal aliens were arrested during the three
surveys .

In 1978, plaintiffs Herman Delgado, Ramona Correa, Francisca Labonte, and Marie Miramontes collectively filed an action
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.3 6 Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the surveys, contending that
25

Id. at 643.

26 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1761.

27 ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
28 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1760.
29 Id. at 1770 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 Id.
31 Id.

Id.
Id. The experiences of respondents Miramontes, Labonte, and Correa were
similar. All were frightened by the sudden entrance of the INS agents and felt
compelled to respond to the questions asked of them. Id. Respondent Correa is an
American citizen; Labonte and Miramontes are permanent resident aliens. Id. at
1761 n.1.
34 Id. at 1770 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35 ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
36 Delgado, 104 S.Ct. at 1761. A separate action, filed by the ILGWU, was later
consolidated with the action brought by the four employees. Upon the INS's motion, the ILGWU was dismissed from the action for lack of standing. A motion for
class certification was also denied. Id.
32

33
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they violated the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the equal protection
clause of the fifth amendment. 7
The parties filed a series of cross motions for summary judgment.38 The plaintiffs questioned the validity of the search warrants, as well as the propriety of the detention and questioning of
workers during the surveys.3 9 Finding for the INS, the district
court held that the employees had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their workplaces and thus no standing to contest the
surveys, which had been conducted pursuant either to warrant or
consent. 4° Relying on Terry v. Ohio, 4 ' the court reasoned that police officers may ask questions of anyone, and held that the
did not
mere questioning of the plaintiffs during the surveys
43
amount to a seizure under the fourth amendment.
On appeal, in ILGWU v. Sureck, 44 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the entire workforce had
been seized for the duration of each survey. 45 The appeals court
emphasized the detentive environment created by the survey and
maintained that no reasonable person would have believed that
he was at liberty to leave the workplace. 46 The court also held
that, notwithstanding the statutory authority conferred by Congress,47 INS investigators could not detain and question workers
without a reasonable suspicion that each individual so questioned
was an illegal alien.48
37 Id. The fifth amendment issue was never addressed by either the district court
or the court of appeals. ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 628 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
38 ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984).
39 Id.
40 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1761.
41 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Terry.
42 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1761; cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (no
constitutional prohibition against policeman questioning anyone on streets).
43 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1761. The district court also based its decision on the
authority granted to the INS by the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952
(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1976), which gives INS agents authority to question
aliens. See ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS
v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). See infra note 55 for the text of § 1357(a) of
the INA.
44 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758
(1984).
45 Id. at 634.
46 Id.
47 See infra note 55.
48 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 638.
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Recognizing that the decision of the Ninth Circuit imposed
serious restraints on the enforcement of the immigration laws,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 49 The Court reversed,
concluding that none of the factory surveys constituted a seizure
of an entire workplace and that the INS questioning of employees did not amount to seizures violative of the fourth
amendment.5"
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)5 in an attempt to deal systematically with the flow of
illegal aliens entering the United States.5 2 The Act sets forth the
requirements for legal immigration into the United States5 3 and
confers upon INS agents broad power to investigate possible violations,5 4 including the right to question, without warrant, suspected aliens regarding their right to be in the country.5 5 In
recent years, with the increasing number of aliens illegally entering the United States, the INS has relied heavily upon its statutory authority to aid in the apprehension of violators of the
immigration laws. 5 6
The Supreme Court has long recognized the power of ConINS v. Delgado, 103 S. Ct. 1872 (1983).
Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1760.
51 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11011503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
52 Earlier immigration statutes were usually enacted in response to a particular
immigration problem or to exclude a particular class of immigrants. Blackie's
House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 72
COLUM. L. REV. 593, 595 (1972).
53 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1185 (Supp. V 1981).
54 Id. §§ 1251-1260 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
55 Id. § 1357(a) (1976). That section provides that:
Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
his right to be or to remain in the United States;
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or
attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or
regulation made in pursuance of laws regulating the admission,
exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, or to arrest any alien in the
United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested
is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation
and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his
49
50

arrest. ...

Id. (emphasis added). The Attorney General is charged with the administration and
enforcement of the immigration laws and he, in turn, is empowered to delegate that
authority to the INS. Id. § 1103(a). The Attorney General has authorized the
agents of the INS to enforce § 1357(a) of the INA. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(c) (1984).
56 72 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1972).
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gress to regulate immigration. 57 Nevertheless, aliens-whether58
legal or illegal-enjoy the protections of the Constitution.
Thus, the INS, as a law enforcement agency, must operate within
the limits "placed on permissible police conduct by the fourth
amendment. ' 59 There is, therefore, an inherent tension between
the need of the government to locate and apprehend illegal
aliens and the right of aliens to be free from unreasonable
seizures.6 ° The courts have failed, however, to develop coherent
fourth amendment standards for controlling the systematic enforcement practices, such as factory surveys, of the INS. 6
In Terry, the Supreme Court undertook a two-step inquiry
with respect to seizures that did not amount to "traditional
arrest[s]." 6 2 First, it determined whether a "seizure" had in fact
occurred.63 If a seizure was found to have occurred, the Court
then questioned its reasonableness. 64 In response to the first inquiry, the Terry Court indicated that even a brief detention was
comprehended by the fourth amendment. 65 A "seizure," the
Court observed, occurred "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." ' 66 The
Supreme Court has uniformly applied the Terry standard, requir57 E.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 769-70 (1972); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (Chinese exclusion case).
58 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (recognizing illegal aliens as "persons" guaranteed due process by fifth and fourteenth amendments); United States
v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (fourth amendment protects aliens
and citizens); United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832, 833-34 (D. Vt. 1899)
(aliens entitled to protections of fourth and fifth amendments). But cf. Immigration
Policy, supra note 1, at 1372 n.8 ("The courts have not, however, clearly explained
whether the [fourth] amendment directly protects aliens because it is not by its
terms limited to citizens, or whether it instead applies only because INS activities
may impinge on the rights of citizens as well as aliens.").
59 Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1372; see also United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (fourth amendment prohibits INS from "stopping
or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens"); Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981)
(authority of INS to question persons "believed to be ... alien[s] is limited by the
restrictions of the fourth amendment") (citing Lee v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 499-500
(3d Cir. 1979)).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
61 Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1376.
62 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-31.
63 Id. at 16.
64 Id. at 20-21.
65 Id. at 16.
66 Id.; see also id at 19 n. 16 (seizure occurs whenever a police officer in some way
restrains "the liberty of a citizen").
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ing a discernible restraint on an individual's freedom of movement before finding that a "seizure" has taken place.67
Lower Federal courts have relied on Terry and its progeny
when evaluating the propriety of INS area control operationsparticularly factory surveys-and generally have found such activities to constitute "seizures." 68 In Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod (Pilliod H ),69 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin several area
control operations, including factory surveys, which were undertaken by the INS. 7" The Federal district court focused on the
INS practice of stationing agents at all exits during factory
surveys and concluded that the practice resulted in "seizures"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 7 ' The court found
that the sole purpose of securing the premises in that manner
was to ensure that the INS officers could " 'control' the aliens
during the course of the 'control operations.' ",72 The INS argued that the factory surveys were conducted with the consent of
those on the premises and that the agents stationed at the exits
did not force anyone to remain.73 In rejecting this argument, the
court found that the purpose of stationing officers at the exits
was "to restrict egress. ' 74 The district court concluded that
"[t]his limitation on the freedom to walk away means that a
75
seizure has occurred for purposes of the fourth amendment.
The Ninth Circuit found the reasoning of the Piliod II court
to be persuasive in Sureck. 76 The circuit court therein relied on
67 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448
U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 55254 (1980) (plurality opinion); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 726-27 (1969).
68 See, e.g., ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S.Ct. 1758 (1984); Ojeda-Vinales v. INS, 523 F.2d 286 (2nd Cir.
1975); Shu Fuk Cheung v. INS, 476 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1973); Au Yi Lau v. INS,
445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Illinois Migrant Council
v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
69 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
70 Id. at 1014-15. This case had previously received extensive treatment in the
courts. See Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill.
1975)
(Pilliod1), afd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified as to remedy, 548 F.2d 715 (7th
Cir. 1977) (en banc),permanent injunction issued, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
71 Pilliod H, 531 F. Supp. at 1018.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1018-19.
74 Id. at 1019.
75 Id.
76 For a discussion of Sureck, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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the "reasonable person" test enunciated by Justice Stewart in
United States v. Mendenhall,77 and concluded that a "seizure" of the
entire workforce had taken place.7 s The Sureck court acknowledged that some of the employees had been able to move
79
throughout the factory while the surveys were taking place.
Nevertheless, it determined that the number of INS agents employed during the survey and the method of its execution "represented a threatening presence

. . .

to the reasonable worker." 80

As did the Pilliod II court, the Sureck court emphasized that the
secured the exits in order to produce a
INS investigators had
"captive workforce." 8 The court also stressed the disruptive element of surprise involved in the initiation of the surveys, as well
as the clearly visible manifestations of authority, such as badges
and handcuffs.82
The second step in the Terry analysis requires that the reasonableness of a seizure be assessed. 83 That determination requires a balancing of the governmental interest served by the
seizure against the severity of the invasion imposed by the
seizure. 1 4 The Terry Court mandated that "in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
'
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. 85
77 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion). The Mendenhall test is an elaboration
upon the definition of "seizure" as provided in Terry. According to Justice Stewart,
a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even
where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled.
Id. at 554 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Although the Mendenhall test was
not adopted by a majority of the Court, the test was employed by the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1981).
78 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 634.
79 Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
80 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 634.
81 Id. at 631-32.
82 Id. at 634.
83 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
84 Id. at 21; accord Camara v. Municipal Court, 397 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967).
85 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (footnote omitted); see Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. 1319,
1324 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 692 (1981); Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
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Federal courts have differed in their application of the Terry
reasonableness standard to the activities of INS agents. The District of Columbia Circuit has established a two-tiered standard 86
from which tests in other circuits have evolved. In Yam Sang Kwai
v. INS,8 7 agents of the INS surrounded the petitioner's restaurant
and secured the exits. 88 Other agents entered the restaurant and
questioned the petitioner regarding his right to be in the country.8 9 The court, in evaluating that activity, relied on the statutory authority conferred on INS agents90 to "interrogate any alien
as to his right to be in the United States."' That ruling was later
modified in Au Yi Lau v. INS,9 2 wherein the petitioners, restaurant
employees, had been physically detained and questioned about
their immigration status.9 3 The court distinguished the facts
before it from those presented in Yam Sang Kwai, which, it recogthe individassumes
involved "mere
nized,
'4 questioning,
analogized
the
Lau court
The Au Yi which
ual's cooperation.
circumstances to those in Terry and held that INS agents could
forcibly detain a person for questioning only "under circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion, not arising to the level of
probable cause to arrest, that the individual so detained is ille95
gally in this country."
Hence, the District of Columbia two-tiered standard encompasses both a constitutional and a statutory review of the activity
of INS agents.9 6 If an agent seizes an individual for questioning,
the agent must be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that
the questioned person is an illegal alien.9 7 If no seizure has taken
86 See Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445
F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411
F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1970).
87 411 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1970).
88 Id. at 684.
89 Id. at 684-85. In Yam Sang Kwai, petitioner argued that he was effectively arrested the moment INS agents surrounded his restaurant and restricted his freedom of movement. The court held that because the petitioner was unaware of the
officers surrounding his restaurant, and therefore unaware that he was not free to
leave, there was no arrest. The court observed that "[t]here can be no seizure
where the subject is unaware that he is 'seized.' " Id. at 686.
90 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
91 Yam Sang Kwai, 411 F.2d at 686 (emphasis in original).
92 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
93 Id. at 219-21.
94 Id. at 222.
95 Id. at 223.
96 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 636.
97 Id.
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place, then the agent need only articulate a reasonable belief that
the subject of his inquiry is an alien, as required by section
287(a)(1) of the INA.9 8
Although the District of Columbia formula has gained wide
acceptance in other jurisdictions,9 9 its validity has been questioned in the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce.'°° In that case, the INS argued that section
287(a)(1) of the INA permitted Border Patrol officers to stop cars
near the Mexican border and question their occupants about
their citizenship status.' l0 The sole justification proffered by the
INS for the stops was the apparent alienage of the cars' occupants. 10 2 The Court determined that the stops posed a serious
threat to the fourth amendment rights of those citizens who
might be mistaken as aliens, notwithstanding the considerable
governmental interest in preventing illegal immigration. 10 3 The
Court imposed stricter criteria upon which the INS had to justify
such stops, requiring that "[e]xcept at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the
country. '104 The Brignoni-Ponce Court, however, expressly reserved the question of whether INS investigators could stop per98 Id.

See supra note 55 for the text of the relevant statutory provisions.
99 E.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en
banc), permanent injunction issued, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Ojeda-Vinales
v. INS, 523 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1975); Shu Fuk Cheung v. INS, 476 F.2d 1180 (8th
Cir. 1973).
100 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See infra note 106 for cases questioning the District of
Columbia formula.
101 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 876-77.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 878-84. The Brignoni-Ponce Court emphasized the considerable problem of illegal immigration and noted the minimally intrusive nature of the stop in
question. Id. at 878-80. The Court recognized, however, that the fourth amendment limits the discretion that may be lawfully exercised by Border Patrol officers
when deciding whom to stop. Id. at 882.
104 Id. at 884 (footnote omitted). Brignoni-Ponce was one of a series of decisions
by the Supreme Court which recognized that the statutory authority of INS agents
must be exercised within the limitations of the fourth amendment. In AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the INS relied upon 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(3) (1976), which authorizes warrantless searches of vehicles that are
within a reasonable distance of any United States boundary, to justify the search of
a car 25 miles from the Mexican border by a roving unit of the Border Patrol. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268. The Court held that such searches could not be
made without probable cause to believe that the car contained illegal aliens. Id. at
272-73. Similarly, in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), the Court im-
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sons whom they reasonably believe are aliens, absent a belief that
such persons are illegally in the country. 0 5 Thus,.the dual standard of the District of Columbia Circuit was permitted to stand.
A number of courts have relied on Brignoni-Ponce as a basis
for rejecting the two-tiered formula.' 1 6 In Illinois Migrant Council
v. Pilliod (Pilliod1),107 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin INS area control operations that involved stops of pedestrians, as well as factory surveys and "raids" on dormitories, claiming that such
activity violated the fourth amendment.10 8 In construing section
287(a)(1) of the INA, the district court disapproved of the twotiered standard, maintaining that it was neither realistic nor conducive to the protection of fourth amendment rights. 0 9 "The
line between mere questioning and forcible detention," the Pilliod I court observed, "is faint and too easily crossed." ' 10 The
court noted that one encountering an INS agent is not likely to
feel free to walk away or to refuse to answer."' Relying on
Brignoni-Ponce, which dealt with vehicular stops,"1 2 the district
court ruled "that an INS agent must reasonably suspect on the
basis of specific articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom" that an individual stopped and questioned is an illegal alien. "3 The PilliodI court saw no reason to grant the driver
of an automobile greater freedom of movement than that given a
posed the same limitations upon vehicular searches conducted by the Border Patrol
at permanent checkpoints removed from the border. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 892-98.
105 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 n.9.
106 E.g., ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v.
Delgado, 104 S.Ct. 1758 (1984); Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd,
540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified as to remedy, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en
banc), permanent injunction issued, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982); cf Immigration
Policy, supra note 1, at 1373-75 (1983) (discussing problems posed by two-tiered
test).
107 398 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill.
1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified
as to remedy, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc),permanentinjunction issued, 531 F.
Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
108 Id. at 887-91.
109 Id. at 898-99.
110 Id. at 899.

iI1 Id. This assertion was supported by the facts. One of the plaintiffs, Larry
Sandoval, was approached by INS agents who requested identification. Id. at 887.
Mr. Sandoval, an American citizen of Mexican descent, refused to comply and was
grabbed and forced into the backseat of the agents' car. Only after declaring his
citizenship was Mr. Sandoval released. Id.
112 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of BrignoniPonce.
113 Pilliod 1, 398 F. Supp. at 899.
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pedestrian." 4
Similarly, in Marquez v. Kiley,' 1 5 the plaintiffs claimed that the
INS procedure of detaining pedestrians to question them about
their status as aliens violated the fourth amendment.1 16 The district court acknowledged that law enforcement officers may freely
ask questions of anyone, provided the agents respect an individual's right not to respond and that "no adverse inferences are
drawn from a decision not to reply." ' 1 7 In the context of area
control operations, however, the court found that the "theoretical appeal" of the two-tiered standard was undermined by the
realities accompanying an encounter between an INS agent and a
suspected alien. 1' 8 The court found inherently contradictory the
concept that a person, approached by an INS agent "armed with
a badge or a gun," is going to cooperate voluntarily." 9 It also
found troubling the possibility that a refusal to cooperate or a
nervous demeanor might, under the District of Columbia
formula, provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a
forcible detention. 2 0 Thus, as did the PilliodI court, the court in
Marquez required that INS investigators could only approach
those persons whom they reasonably suspected, based on articulable facts, of being aliens illegally present in the United States. 121
The District of Columbia standard was further modified by
the Third Circuit in Lee v. INS.' 2 2 In Lee, an INS investigator approached two Chinese men walking in the vicinity of a restaurant
114 Id. at 898; see also United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1973)
(pedestrians and automobile driver should be similarly treated for purposes of
fourth amendment). But cf. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1076
(7th Cir. 1976) (Tone, J., dissenting) (vehicle stops always involve an involuntary
detention and are more intrusive than street encounters), modified as to remedy, 548
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc), permanent injunction issued, 531 F. Supp. 1011
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
115 436 F. Supp 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
116 Id. at 103-05.
'17 Id. at 113 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
118 Id.

119 Id. at 113-14.
120

Id.
121
122

Id. at 114. The court added that
[t]he spectre of INS investigators cruising through neighborhoods
where large numbers of foreign-born people are known to reside and
work in search of people who "look like" aliens, engaging many, if not
most, in detentive stops and transporting to INS headquarters those
who cannot provide on-the-spot documentation of various personal circumstances, is fundamentally offensive to this nation's historical concepts of proper law enforcement techniques.

Id.
599 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1979).
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known to employ illegal aliens. 1 23 As the investigator began to
question the men concerning their alienage, one of them, Mr.
Lee, became nervous and began to walk away.' 24 The agent ordered Lee to stop, 1 25 whereupon Lee admitted to being an illegal
26
alien.'
The Third Circuit, in reviewing the propriety of the investigator's conduct, was not concerned with characterizing the encounter as either "mere questioning" or a "temporary forcible
detention. " 27 Instead, the court examined the stop and interrogation to determine whether it was " 'reasonably related in scope
to the justification for [its] initiation,' 128 subject to a " 'threshold of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop.' "129
30
The court found that the agent had acted within those bounds.
In Babula v. INS,' 3' the Third Circuit, utilizing the Lee standard, 13 2 held that a tip from a reliable informant that a certain
factory employed illegal Polish immigrants, together with other
indicia of employment of illegal aliens, was sufficient to justify
"the minimally intrusive questioning that the agents conducted."' 33 Unlike its decision in Lee, however, the Third Circuit
departed from the requirement that an INS agent possess a reasonable and individualized suspicion that the subject of an in123 Id. at 498. Both men were speaking Chinese and were dressed in clothing
typically worn by kitchen help. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 498-99.
127 Id. at 502.
128 Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
129 Id. (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61 (2d Cir. 1977)).
130 Id.
131 665 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1981).
132 Id. at 295. For a discussion of Lee, see supra notes 122-30 and accompanying
text. The Babula court did not consider whether the survey therein constituted a
seizure of the workforce.
133 Babula, 665 F.2d at 296. The Babula court found that
[t]he agents at H&H [the factory being surveyed] knew the following:
(1) that all persons in the factory definitely worked for an employer who
an informant had stated employed illegal aliens, and (2) that the night
foreman, Hurbuda, spoke English with difficulty, but spoke Polish fluently. Moreover, before conducting any questioning, the agents inquired about the one Polish alien that the informant had named and that
the agents had reason to believe they could arrest. [The general manager] told them that he was no longer employed at H&H, but had
worked there previously. This information added credibility to the informant's assertion that H&H employed illegal aliens.
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quiry is an illegal alien. 134 Under the Babula court's analysis,
there was "no irreducible requirement" of individualized suspicion.135 The court construed Brignoni-Ponce as permitting the
questioning of the occupants of a car about their alien status even
though there was no suspicion that a particular individual was an
alien. 136 Consequently, the questioning of the petitioners during
the factory survey on less than a reasonable suspicion of illegal
alienage was permitted by the Third Circuit and was deemed no
more intrusive than the questioning of the occupants of an
137
automobile.

The Ninth Circuit, in Sureck, was also required to determine
38
the reasonableness of a seizure resulting from a factory survey.1
Having found that a survey constituted a seizure of the entire
workforce, 39 the court turned its attention to the constitutional
standard that governed the activity of the INS agents. 140 After
reviewing the District of Columbia cases and their progeny, 141
the court held that INS agents could not "seize or detain workers" for questioning unless the agents could articulate objective
facts that supported a reasonable suspicion that each person
questioned was an illegal alien.' 42 The court placed great emphasis on the requirement that the suspicion be individualized as to
each person questioned. 143 The INS had contended that individualized suspicion was not required,' 44 relying on United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,1 45 wherein the Supreme Court had upheld the
Border Patrol practice of stopping vehicles at permanent check134

Id.; id. at 299-300 (Adams, J., concurring).

135 Id. at 296 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61

(1976)).
136 Id. This interpretation is contrary to the spirit of Brignoni-Ponce. See id. at 299300 (Adams, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 296. The court also noted that individualized suspicion is not required
when dealing with neither "searches nor the sanctity of private dwellings." Id.
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). The Babula
court was also satisfied that, because all employees were questioned, a finding of
arbitrariness or "unconstrained discretion" on the part of the agents was precluded. Id.
138 See ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. 104 S. Ct.
1758 (1984).
139 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
140 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 634.
141 Id. at 635-38. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the District of Columbia Circuit cases.
142 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 638.
143 Id. at 639-43.
144 Id. at 640.
145 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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points to question the occupants concerning their alienage. 146
The court rejected that argument and found that the surprising
and disruptive nature of the surveys was more analogous to the
activity of the roving patrols condemned in Brignoni-Ponce than it
was to the predictable, brief, and minimally intrusive nature of
the fixed checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.'47 The Ninth Circuit also
criticized the Third Circuit's departure, in Babula, from its previous holding in Lee, 148 which had required a " 'threshold of reasonable suspicion' " to justify a stop. 149 Accordingly, the Sureck
court held that the INS had to be able to articulate an individualized suspicion that a person detained and questioned was indeed
an illegal alien.'
Recognizing the discrepancy between Babula and Sureck, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

15 1

Justice Rehnquist, writing

152

for the majority, first examined the limits of the fourth amend153
ment with respect to encounters between police and citizens.
Acknowledging that the diversity of such encounters precluded a
precise definition of those limits, the majority offered the generalization that " 'not all personal intercourse between policemen
and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.'"154 Under the majority's reasoning, a seizure does not occur unless an officer restrains the liberty of a citizen. 155 The Court distinguished the
situation in which police merely approach an individual and ask
for identification from the situation in which police, without even
146 Id. at 563. The Court upheld this practice, despite the lack of any reasonable
individualized suspicion concerning the vehicle's occupants. Id. A finding of individualized suspicion was not required because "the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion," id. at 561, and because the minimal
intrusion involved was far outweighed by the significant public interest involved.
Id. at 556-57.
147 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 640-41.
148 Id. at 641-42.
149 See Lee, 590 F.2d at 502 (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
15o Sureck, 681 F.2d at 643.
151 INS v. Delgado, 103 S.Ct. 1872 (1983).
152 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, was joined by ChiefJustice Burger
and Justices White, Blackmun, and O'Connor. Separate concurrences were filed by
Justice Stevens and Justice Powell. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
concurred in part and dissented in part.
153 Delgado, 104 S.Ct. at 1762. The majority observed that the purpose of the
fourth amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but " 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.' " Id. (quoting MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. at 554).
154 Id. at 1762 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).
155 Id.
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a reasonable suspicion of misconduct, detain an individual who
refuses to identify himself. 156 The majority concluded that mere
police questioning of a citizen, without more, is unlikely to result
in a violation of the fourth amendment. 157 Rather, the Delgado
Court asserted, it is the circumstances surrounding the encounter that may give rise to a determination that a seizure has taken
place.'

58

Relying on the Mendenhall test, the Delgado majority stated
that the INS questioning would not have resulted in an unlawful
detention under the fourth amendment unless the circumstances
of the encounter had been so intimidating that a reasonable person would have concluded that he was not free to leave. 159 Rejecting the claim that the workforce in each factory had been
seized during the surveys, the Court pointed to the freedom of
the workers to move about within the factories and to perform
their usual tasks, notwithstanding the presence of INS agents at
the exits.160 Indeed, the Delgado majority noted, ordinarily "when
people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials,
but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers." 161
The only purpose of the agents' presence at the exits, the Court
declared, was to ensure that all persons in the factories were
questioned. 162 Justice Rehnquist observed that the remaining
agents questioned employees and arrested only those whom they
had probable cause to believe were illegal aliens. 16 Such conduct, the majority urged, would not have led a reasonable person
in the place of the respondents to conclude that he was not free
to leave, so long as he told the truth or, in the alternative, refused
156 Id. Compare Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (request for an examination of defendant's identification did not result in seizure) with Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47 (1979) (individual detained by police after refusing to provide identification
was victim of unreasonable seizure).
157 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1762.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1763 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). See supra note 77 for a discussion of the Mendenhall test.
160 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.

161

Id.

Id. In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist described an incident recounted by one of
the respondents. See id. at 1764 n.6. During one of the October surveys, an agent
stationed at one of the exits attempted to prevent a worker from walking out the
door. The worker pushed the agent aside and ran away. This, according to Justice
Rehnquist, was merely an isolated and ambiguous incident. Id.
162

163

Id. at 1764.
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164

to answer.
The majority also rejected the appeals court's conclusion
that detentive questioning was permissible only where the investigators could articulate objective facts giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion that each person detained and questioned was an illegal alien.' 6 5 Under the Delgado Court's analysis, no such articulation was necessary because no seizure had taken place. 166 Justice
Rehnquist reviewed the experiences of the respondents during
the surveys, describing each as "nothing more than a brief encounter."' 167 He again emphasized that the INS agents simply
questioned people and detained only those who attempted to flee
or hide. 16 8 Since the respondents did not attempt to evade the
agents and were only briefly questioned, the Court concluded
that the encounters were "classic consensual
encounters rather
169
than Fourth Amendment seizures."'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell expressed his belief
that the issue of whether the Davis surveys had amounted to
seizures was a close one. 1 70 In his view, any seizure that might
have taken place at Davis was permissible under the reasoning of
Martinez-Fuerte.17 1 Justice Powell's analysis was founded on the
primacy of the government's interest in conducting factory
sweeps, which, he opined, may be greater than that involved in
utilizing checkpoints. 172 Because the primary reason for illegal
immigration is the desire to seek more lucrative employment, factory surveys, the concurrence reasoned, "strike directly at this
cause, enabling the INS with relatively few agents to diminish the
incentive for the dangerous passage across the border."' 173 In addition, Justice Powell found the objective intrusion into the employees' fourth amendment interests to be equal to, if not less
than, that experienced by the motorists in Martinez-Fuerte, since
the employees could continue their work during the surveys
Id.
Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1764-65.
168 Id. at 1765.
169 Id.
170 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1766 (Powell, J., concurring). According to the INS, factory surveys
account for approximately 60% of the illegal aliens apprehended in the interior of
the United States. Id. at 1766 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 1766 (Powell, J., concurring).
164

165
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while the motorists were detained for up to five minutes. 174
Although Justice Powell acknowledged the surprising nature of
the INS agents' initial entry, he maintained that "the obviously
authorized character of the operation, the clear purpose of seeking illegal aliens, and the systematic and public nature of the survey" should have served to dispel the fears of any lawful
1 75
employees.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred with
that part of the majority opinion which held that the factory
surveys did not constitute a seizure of the entire workforce. 17 6
Justice Brennan dissented from the balance of the opinion, however, finding that the individual respondents had been unlawfully
177
seized by the INS agents during the factory surveys.
The dissent reviewed the Court's previous decisions dealing
with the subject of seizures and concluded that the fourth amendment protects an individual from unreasonable interference by
the police, even when the interference amounts to no more than
a brief stop and questioning. 17 The dissent also recognized the
Mendenhall test as the appropriate standard for determining when
a seizure has taken place, and it seemed to agree with the majority that mere questioning of an individual by a police officer does
1 79
not violate the fourth amendment.

Applying those principles to the facts of the case, Justice
Brennan found that the respondents effectively had been seized
when they were questioned.'8 0 The dissent emphasized four facId.
Id. at 1767 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also filed a brief concurring opinion in which he stated that there was no genuine issue of fact on the question of whether any of the respondents could have reasonably believed that he was
seized. Id. at 1765 (Stevens, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 1767 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan's concurrence was also based upon the observation that workers were free
to move about the factory while the surveys progressed. Id. at 1767 n.2 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177 Id. at 1767 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 Id. at 1768 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
179 Id. at 1769 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan noted, however, that
'[t]he person approached, however, need not answer any question put
to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may
go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or to
answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.'
Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
180 Id.
174

175
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tors in reaching its conclusion: 1) the surveys were carried out by
large groups of agents, usually fifteen to twenty-five, moving systematically through the lines of workers; 2) any illegal aliens discovered by the agents were handcuffed and led away; 3) all of the
factory exits were guarded for the sole purpose of preventing
anyone from leaving; and 4) as the agents moved among the
workers, they displayed their badges and asked "pointed questions" of those they accosted.' 8 ' The presence of these four factors, Justice Brennan concluded, buttressed the respondents'
contention that they felt constrained to answer the questions,
even though they did not wish to do so. 18 2 The dissent harshly
criticized the majority's treatment of each encounter as an isolated event-not unlike an encounter between a single police officer and a passerby on a street corner-characterizing the
majority's conclusions as "rooted more in fantasy than in the recl8 3
ord in this case."'
The dissent also faulted the majority for skirting the need to
delineate standards by which factory survey seizures may bejustified, a necessity obviated by the Court's conclusion that the
surveys did not amount to seizures. 18 4 Previous decisions,Justice
Brennan conceded, had permitted brief investigatory stops by
law enforcement officers on the basis of facts that did not amount
to probable cause for an arrest. 1 8 5 The dissent pointed out, however, that the Court has repeatedly insisted that the police may
not detain and interrogate an individual unless they have a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in some
illicit activity. 186
In the instant case, Justice Brennan found that the individual
seizures of the respondents were assuredly not based on "specific, objective facts."' 18 7 Conceding, however, that the majority of
those arrested during the surveys were illegal aliens, Justice
Brennan focused on the INS agents' instructions to question
every employee.' 8 8 The dissent argued that because many of the
181
182
183
184
185
186
nois,
ware

Id. at 1770 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id.
Id. at 1769 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1771 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 880).
Id. (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699-700 (1981); Ybarra v. Illi444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979); Delav. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-49

(1972); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-28 (1969); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19)).
187 Id.
188 Id.
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workers were citizens or permanent resident aliens, the consequences of the factory surveys were that many lawful workers
were subjected to detentive questioning by INS investigators who
lacked any reasonable basis for suspecting that the workers had
done anything wrong. 1 9 Rather, itseemed to Justice Brennan
that the INS's only basis for interrogating an employee was that
he either appeared to be of Latin descent or spoke Spanish. 9 °
A policy of stopping and interrogating an individual on the
basis of a reasonable suspicion of alienage, however, was also repugnant to Justice Brennan's view of the fourth amendment.' 9 '
The dissent first observed that such a policy offers no protection
to lawful American citizens working in the targeted factories, inasmuch as there is no way "to distinguish with a reasonable degree of accuracy between native-born and naturalized citizens of
Mexican ancestry on the one hand, and aliens of Mexican ancestry on the other."'' 92 Second, the dissent noted that the mere fact
that an individual is an alien does not automatically give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that he is an illegal alien. 193 Although he
recognized the broad powers of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens and to require resident aliens to register with the INS and carry proper identification, Justice
Brennan would not permit enforcement of such policies in a
manner that threatens the rights of American citizens. 194 In the
context of factory surveys, Justice Brennan believed such a result
would be certain if INS agents were permitted to question persons solely on the basis of suspected alienage. 95
Justice Brennan found Justice Powell's reliance on MartinezFuerte to be misplaced. 196 Noting that the "extremely modest"
nature of the intrusion justified the departure in Martinez-Fuerte
189

Id. at 1771-72 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

190 Id.

191 Id. at 1772 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan found implausible the proposition
that experienced INS agents could tell the difference. Id. at 1772 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Such a practice, the dissent suggested,
would be subject to "discriminatory abuse" and exceed the "tolerable limits" permitted by the fourth amendment. Id. Indeed, respondents Correa and Delgado
were both American citizens. See supra note 33.
193 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1772 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
194 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§1302, 1304(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1773 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra
notes 169-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Powell's
concurrence.
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from a particularized suspicion, Justice Brennan maintained that
factory surveys offer no similar guarantees. 9 7 The dissent observed that the motorists in Martinez-Fuertehad some advance notice of the fixed checkpoints, 9 8 whereas the factory surveys
undertaken in Delgado were sudden and surprising to the workers
and caused widespread fear and anxiety.' 99
The dissent viewed the degree of the discretionary judgment
exercised by the INS agents during the surveys as being much
greater than that in the fixed checkpoint operations. 20 0 The
power of the investigators to decide whom to stop and question,
Justice Brennan opined, contributed significantly to the feelings
of anxiety among the workers. 20 ' Furthermore, Justice Brennan
declared that the workers in the surveyed factories had a greater
expectation of privacy than does a motorist who knowingly subjects himself to police surveillance as part of traffic law enforcement. 20 2
In his view, the workplace functions as a "small,
recognizable community" which affords the individual worker a
sense of identity greater than that experienced by one traveling
on a public highway. 2 ' As such, he concluded, the factory employees had a legitimate, although modest, expectation of privacy
in their workplace which was not diminished by the employer's
2 4
consent to the survey. 0
The dissent found only two acceptable alternatives that
would adequately protect fourth amendment rights threatened
by the factory sweeps. 20 5 The INS, Justice Brennan suggested,
should either adopt a policy of stopping only those workers who
are reasonably suspected of being illegal aliens or undertake factory surveys that are "predictably and reliably less intrusive. ' 20 6
197 Delgado, 104 S.Ct. at 1773 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

198 See Marlinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.

199 Delgado, 104 S.Ct. at 1773 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
200 Id. at 1774 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201 Id In a footnote, Justice Powell criticized the dissent's contention that INS
agents have greater discretion to decide whom to question during a survey because
it ignored the fact that officers at the fixed checkpoints had unlimited discretion to
refer a stopped vehicle to a secondary inspection area. Id. at 1767 n.6 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
202 Id. at 1774 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203 Id.
204 Id. (citing Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968)). Justice Brennan
also noted that there was no historical precedent for the factory surveys, in contrast
to traffic checkpoints, which were supported by a long history of acceptance. Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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The first alternative, he noted, would satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" requirement enunciated in previous cases, because none
of the conditions that were presented in Martinez-Fuerte existed in
the instant case.20 7 The second alternative offered by Justice
Brennan would attempt to redesign the factory sweeps along the
lines of the fixed traffic checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.2 °8 One
possibility, according to Justice Brennan, would be to require
INS agents to obtain an administrative warrant based on "a
showing that reasonable grounds exist for believing that a substantial number of workers

. . .

are undocumented aliens subject

to deportation, and that there are no practical alternatives to conducting such a survey. "209
The majority opinion may be criticized for what it does as
well as for what it fails to do. A ruling that a factory survey does
not constitute a seizure of the entire workforce under investigation ignores the reality of the situation. 2 '0 Delgado presented an
opportunity for the Court to facilitate the enforcement efforts of
the INS, which had been seriously limited by previous
decisions.2 1
The Court focused primarily on the presence of agents at the
factories' exits and concluded that it was only to ensure that all
employees were questioned. 1 2 That assertion is, however, not
supported by the facts. First, the INS conceded that although its
policy requires agents to question everyone, manpower limitations often make it impossible for them to do so.'2

Second, and

more importantly, the INS freely admitted that the purpose of
stationing agents at exits is to "prevent persons from leaving the
207 Id. For a discussion of Martinez-Fuerte, see supra notes 145 & 146 and accompanying text.
208 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1774 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
209 Id. at 1774-75 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (issuance of warrant to conduct
building inspection not dependent upon showing of specific knowledge of condition of particular dwelling).
210 See Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1767 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Brennan placed more emphasis on the facts than did the majority
in reaching his conclusion that the respondents were seized during the factory
surveys. See id. at 1769-70 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211 Cf Catz, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Nonborder Searches for Illegal Aliens: The
Immigration and NaturalizationService Meets the Constitution, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 66, 85-86
(1978) (decision in Martinez-Fuerte concession to eroding power of INS).
212 See Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763; supra note 161 and accompanying text.
213 Sureck, 681 F.2d at 627.
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workplace." '2 1 4 The majority, however, chose to ignore that admitted purpose. More accurately, the purpose of guarding the
exits is to make sure that no one leaves before being questioned.
Both the majority and Justice Brennan agreed that the freedom of the workers to move around within the factories during
the surveys precluded a determination that the entire workforce
was seized.215 As one Federal judge has noted, however, "[a]
man may be in custody without testing the bounds of that custody. A man may be free to move within a small area, but if he is
restrained from going where otherwise he would have a right to
go his liberty of movement is restricted. 2'1 6 The Court asserted
that the workers' freedom of movement was restricted by their
own "voluntary obligations to their employers. 21 7 The term
"voluntary" implies a choice. The presence of the investigators
at the exits, however, precluded any choice.
Justice Rehnquist characterized the surveys as merely the exercise of the agents' right to ask questions, citing the right of any
individual to walk away without answering. 2 8 That conclusion,
to paraphrase Justice Brennan, is simply fantastic.219 One cannot
realistically contend that where an individual, perhaps an illegal
alien, refuses to answer a question put to him, an INS agent will
merely shrug his shoulders and turn his attention elsewhere. It is
far more likely that a refusal to answer a question will serve as a
basis for suspecting that the individual is an illegal alien. 2
Thus, no one who is approached by an INS agent is, in reality,
free to walk away.
The Court's refusal to find that any seizures had taken
place-either of the workforce as a whole or of the individual respondents-rendered moot any discussion by it of standards by
See id. at 626-27 (sole purpose of stationing agents at exits is to prevent workers from leaving); supra text accompanying note 191.
215 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763; id. at 1767 n.2 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
216 Yam Sang Kwai, 411 F.2d at 691 (Wright, J., dissenting).
217 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1763.
218 See id. at 1762-63.
219 See id. at 1769 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220 See supra text accompanying notes 112 & 124-26. One commentator notes
[that a person's very attempt to extricate herself from questioning may
give the questioning agent cause to seize her negates any suggestion
that the initial encounter is nondetentive; if the person subject to questioning is not in fact free to walk away without facing further consequences, the initial questioning is itself detentive.
Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1375 (footnote omitted).
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which the constitutionality of such seizures may be gauged.2 2 '
Implicit in the Delgado opinion is the Court's embrace of the twotiered standard of the District of Columbia Circuit. Those courts
that have refused to acknowledge the dual standard have recognized, in similar circumstances, that a person approached by an
INS agent is effectively seized for the purposes of the fourth
amendment. 22 2 A requirement of a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage on the part of the agent has therefore been required
by those courts. 22 ' The Delgado majority has perpetuated the District of Columbia Circuit's distinction, however, between what
the INS characterizes as mere questioning and a seizure.2 2 4
The approach taken by Justice Brennan and by the Ninth
Circuit in Sureck conforms more to the reality of the INS area control operations. A requirement of a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage before allowing detentive questioning is not only
more responsive to the fourth amendment, but also is implicit in
section 287(a) of the INA. 225 The INA grants INS agents the
power without warrant to interrogate any alien or person believed
to be an alien and section 287(a) implies that the statute is intended to permit a limited detention for the purpose of interro226
gation. 2 6 Congress would not have noted explicitly that a
warrant would be unnecessary for mere questioning, unless it
contemplated that some2 27form of search or seizure would accompany such questioning.
Admittedly, this type of detentive questioning does not
amount to a full arrest and thus need not be supported by probable cause. 2 28 Rather, it is more analogous to the type of brief
encounter contemplated in Terry.22 9 In cases involving this type
of minimally intrusive stop, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
insisted that the stop be justified by some objective determination by the law enforcement officer that the person stopped is, or
is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. 23 0 It is therefore in221 Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1764; id. at 1771 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
222 See Sureck, 681 F.2d at 634; Marquez, 436 F. Supp. at 113-14; Pilliod 1, 398 F.
Supp. at 899.
223 See Sureck, 681 F.2d at 638; Marquez, 436 F. Supp. at 114; Pilliod, 398 F. Supp.
at 899.
224 See Delgado, 104 S. Ct. at 1762-64; cf. Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 222-23 (discussing
difference between "mere questioning" and "forcible detention").
225 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1976). For the text of § 1357(a), see supra note 55.
226 Yam Sang Kwai, 411 F.2d at 691 (Wright, J., dissenting).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 693 (Wright, J., dissenting).
229 Id.
230 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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consistent for the Court to permit what is truly detentive questioning of an individual on less than a reasonable suspicion that
he is an illegal alien. The Terry standard never contemplated the
general, or class, suspicion that was permitted in these factory
surveys. 2 3
Joel L. Botwick
See Yam Sang Kwai, 411 F.2d at 694 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan offered a number of alternatives to factory surveys as they are
presently conducted, including the use of administrative warrants. Delgado, 104 S.
Ct. at 1774-75 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is questionable, however, whether administrative warrants, used, for example, for building
inspections, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), may be employed for the purpose of searching for and seizing illegal aliens. At least one
Federal court has answered in the affirmative. See Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v.
Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Warrants to search premises, however,
do not authorize the seizure of persons found on the premises. Pilliod 11, 531 F.
Supp. at 1020 (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)). Although an
administrative warrant may give INS agents the authority to enter a suspected
workplace, the problems inherent in the surveys would be likely to continue unresolved.
Other alternatives to factory surveys lie within the legislative domain. Since a
major reason for illegal immigration is the lure of higher paying jobs, an effective
means of controlling the flow of illegal aliens would be to impose meaningful penalties on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens. Note, Reasonable Suspicion of
IllegalAlienage as a Precondition to "Stops" of Suspected Aliens, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485,
500 (1975). Bills which have sought prohibitions against employers have been introduced in Congress since 1951 but have failed to pass. Note, The Requirement of
Individualized Suspicion: An End to INS Factory Sweeps?, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1069,
1095 (1983). Opponents of such bills argue that imposing sanctions against an
employer would have a discriminating impact on the hiring of minority groups or
legal aliens. Fragomen, supra note 2, at 90.
In March of 1982, Senator Alan K. Simpson (R., Wyo.) and Representative
Romano L. Mazzoli (D., Ky.) introduced one such bill to restructure the nation's
immigration laws. Among other provisions, the bill imposed criminal sanctions on
employers hiring illegal aliens. The bill also granted permanent resident status to
millions of illegal aliens living in the United States before a designated cut-off date.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1982, at B17, col. 1. On June 20, 1984, the House of Representatives narrowly passed a version of the bill. The Senate had previously passed
its own version of the bill in 1982 and 1983. N.Y. Times,June 21, 1984, at AI, col.
6.
A joint conference committee was designated to reconcile the differences between the two bills. Id. The conference, however, failed to agree on whether to
impose a limit on Federal payments to the states for welfare benefits to its illegal
aliens who would gain legal status under the bill. Consequently, the bill failed to
pass before Congress adjourned in October 1984. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1984, at
A16, col. 4.
Another possible way to curb the tide of illegal aliens would be the granting of
amnesty to all illegal aliens currently living in the United States. Fragomen, supra
note 2, at 124. This action would have the effect of minimizing the need for area
control operations within the interior of the United States, resulting in a savings of
manpower and money which could be used towards increasing the fortification of
our borders. Id. at 124 n.138.
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